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Improper methods of police interrogation are known to every country in tbe 
vorld. And everywhere, it is agreed that an accused's confession of guilt whlch 
IllS been procured through pbysical violence, psychological intimidation, or im-
"oper inducements or promises cannot be considered in evidence against him at 
rial. The primary reason why involuntary confessions are excluded from evidence 
, that they are unreliable indices of truth; men have been known to admit crimes 
,r which they are innocent, simply to escape the pain of torture or to obtain an 
7CSistible henefit, 
The exclusionary practice also expresses society's condemnation of police 
third degree" methods, whiCh not only violate the accused's privilege against 
elf-incrimination,' but, by inflicting harm on one merely suspected, not convict-
d, of crime, nullify his constitutional right to the presumption of innocence.2 
DUS the practice serves purposes other than the mere need to decide cases 
pon trustworthy evidence: by removing the ultimate incentive it serves to dis-
Jurage the police from using illegal questioning methods. 
In light of these considerations it is understandable that Ethiopian law 
'Owns severely upon the use of coercion against persons being investigated under 
JSpicion of crime. The Criminal Procedure Code states quite clearly tbat "No 
olice officer or person in authority shall offer or use or make or cause to be 
ffered, made or used any inducement, threat, promise or any other improper 
,e:bod to any person examined by the police.'" Violation of this command sub-
:cts the police officer to both civil' and penal' sanctions. And, of course, the 
lUrts do not allow into evidence confessions which have been obtained by 
)rce.6 
I All references in this arlicle are to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1961, unless otherwise 
stated. !\.... 
.. Recognized in Art. 27(2), Crim. Pro. C. 
~. Art. 53. Rev. ConsL 
I. Art. 31. 
I. Arts. 2035 and 2038, ay. c. 
0, AlL 417. Pen. C. 
i. It is evident that at least our higher appellate courts arc operating on the understanding 
that convictions may not be based upon involuntary confessions. See. e.g .. the language 
used in Teshome Gabre v. Attorney General (Sup. Imp. 0., 1963', Crim. App. No. 237/56 
(unpUblished, Library, Faculty of law, Haile SelIassie ] University): Although accused's 
statement to the Doiice was uncautinnM. it """,,,,c: vn'1t .. t'S~. o .. A __ ..a ..... .:.\.._ ••• ~--- - --
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But, it must be asked, are the exclusion of coerced confessions and the 
threat of sanctions having !beir intended effect1 To judge from what one sees and 
hears, no. In many cases in the High Court, convictions are based wholly or in 
part upon confessions given by the accused to the police While in their custody. 
And, in many cases, the accused repudiates his confession at trial, claiming it 
was the result of coercion, while the police in turn insist it was not. Even panting 
that many or even most of these claims of beatings and torture are untrue (it 
is hard to believe that all are), the vital question is: how is the trial court to 
distinguish between the free confession and the forced one1 It seems that cases 
are rare in which the accused is able to convince' the court to exclude !be con· 
fession, and no wonder: when the police interrogate a suspect there are no wit· 
nesses, no friends, no family prescnt. Therefore it inevitably boils down to the 
word of the acc"sed against that of the police, and how many of us will believe 
the accused 1 
Foreign "Solutions" to the Third Degree 
This problem of distinguishing voluntary from involuntary confessions is not 
unique to the Empire. It has been faced in many other countries, and "solutions" 
worked out. In England, for example, the rule excluding involuntary confessions. 
was not, by itself, felt sufficient to deter the police from coercive methods. 
Therefore, in the well·known "Judges' Rules," it is laid down that the 'police must 
inform a suspect of his privilege against self·incrimination as soon as the police 
officer decides in his mind to charge him, and, once the suspect is in custody, he 
may not be questioned at all." Extraction of a confession in violation of the 
Rules confers upon the trial court a discretion to exclude it from evidence. Thus 
the English system tries to avoid the possibility of improper police interrogation, 
by forbidding all interrogation of the accused while he is in custody - the time 
when the "third degree' generally takes place. 
The Americans have resorted to other means of deterring the police from 
using improper methods. In addition to the rule excluding involuntary confessions 
from evidence, the federal courts automatically exclude any confession, "volunt-
ary" or "involuntary," which is obtained while the police are unlawfully holding 
the accused - e.g., during a period of "unnecessary delay" between his arrest 
and his appearance in court." And for the state courts, a federally-imposed rule 
is now evolving which probably will exclude any confession made by an accused 
While in police custody if his right to counsel was denied at that time.lO Like 
the English approach, both of these rules attempt to discourage coercive police 
7. Of course, the burden of proof should properly be on the prosecution to prove the 
confession is voluntary. That is certainly the case in Anglo·American law. See Halsbury's 
Laws oj England (3d ed., London, Butterworth & Co., 1955), vol. 10. Criminal Law. 
para. 860, and Corpus Juris Secundum (New York, American Law Book Co., 1961), 
vo1. 23, Criminal Law, para. 835. 
8. "Special Issue on Police Questioning," Crim. L. Rev .• 1960, pp. 298·356, passim. 
9. Upshaw v. United States (Sup. Ct, U.S. 1948), U.s. Rep., vol. 335, p. 410, LAwyers Ed ... 
93, p. 100; Mallory v. United States, (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1957), U.s. Rep., vol. 354, p. 499, 
lAwyers Ed. 2d, vol. I, p. 1479. 
10. Escobedo v. Illinois (Sup. Ct., U.s., 1964), U.S. Rep., vol. 378, p. 478, LAwyers Ed. U. 
vol. 12. p. 977; Y. Kamisar. 11le Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendernent: 
A Dialogue on 'The Most Pervasive Right' of an Accused," U. oj Chicago L. Rev ... 
vol. 30 (1962), p. 1. 
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methods by denying the police the right to interrogate suspects secretly and at 
length, for under those conditions the "third degreeH flourishes 
I,astly, let us mention the Indian approach. Under the Indian Criminal Pro-
cedure Codell the police are permitted to question a suspect at length. and need 
not ,caution him to remain silent. But generally,12 no oonfession the accused makes 
to the police or while in police custody is admissible against him at trial; to be 
admissible it must be made before a magistmte~ who will ensure that the accused 
is making it voluntarily and with knowledge of his right to remain silent before 
recording it. The theory of this rule is, apparently, that the only confessions which 
are cerrain to be voluntary are those made to a court, and that confessions made 
to the police are bound to be tainted with the suspicion of coercion. To dis-
courage police coercion, then, the Indians do not recognize as evidence the re-
sults of police interrogations.13 
The EthiopIWz Approach: Article 35 
In the three legal systems referred to above, the rule excluding involuntary 
confessions from evidence is not relied upon to discourage improper police in-
terrogation methods. Nor are the usual penal and civil sanctions found effective,,14 
Rather, in each country, supplementary rules have been adopted to discoura.ge 
such methods, and thereby protect the criminal suspect from police abuse of 
his rights. What, then, of our system? Does Ethiopian law provide the weapons 
which are needed to fight these problems? I believe that it does, ,at least in part. 
Article 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides: 
- Power of court to record statements and confessions. 
(1) Any court may record any statement or confession made to it at 
any time before the opening of a preliminary inquiry or Itrial. 
(2) No court shan record any such statement or confession unless. upon 
questioning the person making it. it ascertains that such persoDvoluntarily 
makes such statement or confession. A note to this effect shall be made 
on the record 4 
11. Indian Code oj Critninal Procedure~ 1898 (Lucknow, E.astem Book Co., 1962). 
12. Sections 2S and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act (1872) state the e.xcluaiooHy rule. But 
Section 27 provides ,an exception in that where facts (c .. g." physical evidence) are discover-
ed in consequence of a confession made io the police, the relevant part of the 
confession is admissible at trial. 
13. With the exception mentioned in note 12, above. It is questionable whether the rules 
can have great deterrent effect on the police, so long as the incentive embodied in Section 
27 exists. But it is apparently felt that the· absolute reliablity of the accuSC4f. sta.tement 
in oonsequ nee of which the facts: were discovered outweighs other policy considerations 
which would militate for exclusion. 
14. Among the reasons why in many countries it is extremely difficult to makeeffeotivc 
usc of civil and pellal remedies against the police are: difficulties of proof; the ImAI1 
amount ,of money dlJ-na,l!S which ,can be recovered; and the reluctance of prosecutoria1 
and judicial authorities to, proceed against poUcc officers. This last point· m.y be of 
particular validity in Ethiopia, where almost all public prosecutors are police officeTl, 
~nlikely to press vigorously against their fcHows. FU rtbCI more, Peoa1 Code A!ticle 417 
lS . not a u~omplaint offence;" therefore there iI DO plaibili,ty foe the irajuied party to 
bnng a pnvatc proecution should the public authorities decline t9 at:t. Art. 44. Crim. 
Pro. c. 
-- 332 -
Print to PDF without this message by purchasing novaPDF (http://www.novapdf.com/)
INVOLUNTARY CoNFESSIONS AND ARTICLE 35, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CoDE 
(3) Such statem¢nt or confession shall be recorded in writing and in 
fuJI by tbe court and shall thereafter be read over to the person making the 
statement or confession, who shall sign and date it. The statement shall then 
be signed by the president of the court. 
(4) A copy of the record shall then be sent to the court before whicb 
the case is to be inquired into or tried, and to the public prosecutor. 
What is the purpose of this artiole? In view of its strong similarity to &C. 
lion 164 of tbe Indian Code.1> it is unquestionable that the drafters of Ethiopia's 
Code were to so= eXitent looking towards the Indian system .. • And in Indian 
law. as we have seen, tbe reason why the magistrate is given power to record 
confessions is that only confessions so recorded are admissible in evidenoe at 
trial. It was the intention of tbe drafters of our Criminal Procedure Code, I 
submit, to require all confessions whicb the polioe wish to have proved at trial, 
recorded and oel'lified "voluntary" under Article 35. Confessions not so recorded 
sbould be inadmissible against tbe accused, as they are in India. 
Why, then, if the drafters so intended did they not expressly so provide in 
the Code? Tbe obvious answer is that the appropriate plaoe for rules of odmissi· 
bility is not the criminal prooedure onde, but .the evidenoe code. The drafters no 
doubt intended that the evidenoe code, when it appeared, would provide the 
1.5. Indian Code 01 Crimitud Procedure, cited at note 11. above. 
Art. 164. Power to record statements and confessions. -
(I) Any P ... idcncy Magistrate, any Magistrate of the firo! elass and any Magi'b&te 
of the second class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government may, 
if he is not a police-officer, lecord any statement or oonfeuion made to him in the 
course of an investigation undcl' this Cllap&cr 01' u.ndu any othCl' law for the time brin, 
in force or at any time . afterwards before the commencement of the inquiry or trial. 
(2) Such statements shaJl be recorded in such of the mannen hereinafter pre-
:scribed for recording evidence as is, in his opinioo, best fitted for the circumstances. 
of the case. Such confessions shall be recorded and signed in the manner provided in 
section 364, and such statements or confessions shall then be forwarded to the Magi-
-strate by whom the case is to be inquired into or tried. 
(3) A Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the person 
making it ,that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he docs 40 it may be 
used as evidence against him and no Magistrate shall record any such conte trion un-
less, upon questioning the person making it. be bas realOll <to believe that it was made 
voluntarily; and, when he records any confession, he shan make a memorandum at the 
foot of such rcoord to the following effect:-
"I have explained to (name) that be is not bound to make a confession and that, 
if he docs so, any confession be may make may be used as evidence against him and 
I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my pn::sence and 
hoariDg, and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be COI1'cct, 
and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him. 
(Signed) A. B., 
Ma,istrate" 
Expkmalion - It is not necessary that the Magistrate receiving and recording a 
confession or statement should be a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case. 
16. Many other articles in the Ethiopian Code are strikingly similar to provisions of the 
Indian Code. For example, note the similarities bc:tween Ethiopian Articles 30, 31, and 
51 and Indian Code Articles 161, 163, and 54 _lively. 
Actually, the direct source of Article 3S and of the other cited articles was more 
likely the Malayan Criminal Procedure Code which, like the codes of many former 
British dependencies, was clo&cly patterned after Indian law. Compare Ethiopian Ar· 
tieles 30, 31, 35 and 51 with Malayan Code Sec •. 112, 114, 115 and 23 respectively. Fo< 
a comparative view of the Commoowea1th "family" of provisions compare the cited 
o«Iion. with the Singapoce (Sees. 120, 122, 123 and 31), Sudan (Seco 117, 118, 119 and 
25) and Northern Nigeria (Sees. 123, 124, 125 and 26) criminal procedure codes. 
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consequences of failure to have a confession recorded hy a judge, just as the law 
of evidence in India and elsewhere" covers such ma~ers. 
Of course it is unfortunate that the procedure and evidence codes could not 
have been promulgated at the ~ame time, therehy obviating such problems as we 
now face. Concededly, it is arguable that tbe Criminal Procedure Code does not 
envision tbe Indian4ype rule I have suggested. It bas been argued,18 for example, 
th .. t the wording of Article 27(2)" implies that confessions made to the police are 
admissible in evidence at trial, and that the police need not, therefore, take advant-
age of the procedure established by AIlticle 35. Granting that ambiguity exists, 
I submit that the soundest course would be to adopt the Indian rule on admissib-
ility, thus requiring judicial screening under Article 35 of all confessions which are 
to be introduced at trial. The followi{l8 considerations are, to my mind, 
• persuasIve: 
I. Under the present system,20 the issue of voluntariness of the confession 
is adjudicated during the trial hearing. If Article 35 were used in all cases the 
issue would be adjudicated prior to trial, thereby eliminating the waste of a full 
coUI'l's21 time and energy, and the need to interrupt consideration of the main 
issues of the case. 
2. Under the present system the issue of voluntariness is adjUdicated at a 
time remote from the interrogation. Evidence which might prove or disprove 
coercion has by then grown stale or disappeared. Often, the police claim that 
the accused's repudiation of bis confession is an "afterthought" on advice from 
his prison-mates, and it is almost impossible for a court to decide wbere the 
truth lies. If Article 35 were used in all ca""" the confession would be recorded 
immediately after it was made, before the accused bad a chance to change his 
mind and "invent" stories of torture. Voluntary confessions so c;ertified under 
Article 35 would then be admissible at trial, and falso claims of coercion could 
not be raised. 
3. There is no justifiable reason wby the police should not use Article 35 
in all cases. The Code DOW requires the police to bring all persons in custody be-
fore the "nearest court within forty-eight hours of his arrest or so soon thereafter 
as local circumstances and communications pennit.''22 If an accused has confessed 
prior to his first appearance in court, it is no inconvenience to ask the judge to 
record it at that time. So long as the judge is . satisfied of the accused's voluntary 
17. See note 16, above. 
18. By some of my students, whose creative discussions inspired many of the ideas in this 
article. 
19. Particularly. the phrase "and that any statement he may make may be used in evidence:' 
It has been further argued that Article 97. which refers to "statements" taken under 
Article 27, shows the drafters· intent that cO"f~.t.fions recorded under Artic1e 27 be 
admissible at trial. But there is an important difference between a "statement" and a 
"confession" in that the latter is necessarily incriminating whereas the fonner is not. 
The failure of Articles 27 and 97 to mention confessions can be taken as demonstrating 
an intent that only non-eonfessional statements are covered by them. 
20. Apparently the police do not presently mak.e use of Article 35, nor do the courb: require 
them to do so. 
21. Article 35 seemingly enables a single judge sitting alone to record a confession, 
whereas at present, in most criminal trials, three-judge benches deal with the question. 
22. Art. 29, Crim. Pro. c. 
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wish to make a statement, he can record it in a brief time. The only conceivable 
reason why the police might wish to avoid this procedure is that the confession 
is not truly voluntary; in such cases of course it does not deserve to be admitted 
in evidence. 
Where the accused confesses subsequent to his initial presentation in court 
but before trial, the inconvenience to the police in bringing the accused before 
the nearest court is slight, and certainly outweighed by the advantages gained 
by having the confession immediately certified as voluntary by a judicial officer. 
Who! Can be Done? 
If these reasons are persllasive, what can be done? The following steps might 
be considered: 
1. The forthcoming code of evidence could provide that no confession shall 
be admissible in any criminal trial if it has not been recorded by a judge under 
Article 35, provided there was opportunity for the police to take advantage of 
tha t procedure. 
But there is no need to wait for the code of evidence. In order to enforce 
the Criminal Procedure Code, and the constitutional guarantees of due process 
and presumption of innocence, the courts could take action immediately: 
2. The Supreme Imperial ¥d High Courts, in cooperation with the Ministry 
at Justice, could exercise their rulemaking power" to provide, explicitly, that after 
a certain date no trial court will admit into evidence any confession made to a 
police officer, etc. which was not recorded under Article 35 despite the opportunity 
for such recording. It could also advise all members of the judiciary on the import· 
ance and meaning of Article 35, and provide them with clear instructions on how 
to carry out their duties thereunder. 
3. The police could adopt the strict policy of making use of the procedure 
which Article 35 provides in all cases where confessions are made. 
It is submiMed that if these above reforms were carried out, all parties would 
benefit thereby. The accused would not so likely experience (or, what is just as 
had, fear) coercive police techniques of interrogation; the innocent suspect would 
not experience unjust harm. The courts would not be faced as often as they are 
today with difficult disputes at trial as to the voluntariness of confessions offered in 
evidence, and could with clearer conscience convict accused persons indicted by 
their own confessions. The police would have a clear opportunity to prove their 
innocence of the frequently-made charges of brutality, and thus to ensure the 
public's trust and cooperation. 
Possible Objections: Repudiation of Recorded Confessions at Trial 
Two possible objections to this proposal are foreseeable. The first is that 
Article 35 recording will accomplish nothing, because defendants will still be free 
to raise the issue of coercion at trial, at which time it will have to be considered 
over again. This would mean the Article 35 court would have wasted its time. 
23. Under the Administration of Justice Proclamation, 1942, Sec. 20(a), (h), Proc. No.2, 
Neg. Gaz.. . . year I, no. I, the Me Negus and the President of the High Court may. 
with the Minister's approval, make rules for the Supreme Court and for the High and 
lower courts respc?Ctive1y. The ~ri~er does not believe that this power has been abrogat-
ed by any prOVISIon of the Crimmal Procedure Code or otherwise with respect to the 
conduct of criminal cases, • 
- 335 -
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There are ·two ways in which the issue of coercion might be raised at trial 
with regard to a confession recorded by a judge under Article 35. A defendant 
might admit that the judge had given him every opportunity to reveal any coercive 
CircUII1Stances. but claim that because be was intimidated by the police he . did 
not dare refuse to make a "voluntary" statement in court. Such a claim, it is 
suggested, should be rejected out of band by the trial court. Once a confession is 
shown to have been recorded in strict accordance with the requirements of Article 
35. the defendant should be foreclosed from ~opening the question of voluntar .. 
iness at trial. Rather, tlhe trial court ought to treat the Article 35 court's recording 
(which implies a certification of voluntariness) in the wayan appellate tribunal 
treats a lower cour.t's finding of fact - that is, as binding unless there has been 
some serious fault in the fact-finding me thod !J or an obviously incorrect legal 
conclusion drawn from the accepted facts·. 
That brings us to the second way in which a recorded confession could be 
attacked at trial - if the recording court did not conduct itself properly under 
Article 35. In order to ensure that lower courts do not . fail to uncover and 
recognize coercion when it exists. they should be given detailed guidance in the 
purpose and operation of Article 35. Furthermore, that article oUght to be broadly 
interpreted by the Supreme Imperial and High Courts to require the recording court 
10 say and do certain prescribed things in order to ensure that recorded statements 
are truly voluntary. For example, lower counts should be instructed to: 
1. ask the accused if he was cautioned by the police under Article 27; if he 
claims he was not, such fact should be noted on the record, and should alert the 
recording court to probe deeper on ~he voluntariness question. In any case the 
court should, before recording anything, remind him of his right to remain silent 
and the possible use in evidence of any statenlent he may make; . 
2. tell the accused very specifically that whether or not he makes a sUi te-
ment he will not be returned to the custody of the police, !but will either be released 
on bail or else detained in the prison (Arts. 59-60); 
3.. ask the accused whether he has been subjected to any threat, promise or 
inducement by the police; 
4. asceItain from the accused and ~he attending police officer how long the 
accused has been in police custody_ If the forty-eight hour limit of Article 2924 
has been violated the court ought to exercise particular caution in accepting the 
statement as voluntarY!J25 and should note on the record the reason for the delay, 
and what took place during the accused's custody; 
24. Guaranteed by Article 51, Rev. Const. 
25. The courts might even consider adopting the American approach (see text accompany-
ing note 9, above), by refusing to admit into evidence any confession, no matter how 
"voluntary," which was made immediately following a period of post-arrest police 
questioning in excess of the forty-eight bour linnt. 
It might be appropriate here to mention that it is by no means clear that the 
police have ·the right, under Article 27, to interrogate an accused for the mentioned 
forty-eight hour period (even assuming nonnal rest and food intervals). Article 27 des-
pite its title, is reasonabJy open to the interpretation that it embodies the English rule 
- i.e., that it permits the police after having established the identity and address of 
an accused in custody, to invite him to make a cautioned statement in answer to the 
accusation or complaint, but not to question him should he decline. However until such 
time as Ethiopia's police are equipped with adequate laboratories, equipment ~d trained 
manpower. to enable t~em to rely heavily on scientific detection methods, it would seem 
unwIse 00 Interpret A·rticJe 27 to prohibit investigation by non-coercive questioning of the 
accused~ 
- 336-
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5. question the accused, in suspicious cases, in chambers with only a clerk: 
pIesent, or in open court buf with police officers excluded. (Of course, such 
questions may relate only to <the issue of voluntariness; the court may not intcuo-
gate the accused in order to obtain a confession.) 
If lower court judges arc required to follow some such procedure, and to 
certify the step; taken in writing, the existence of their affidavits would operate 
as a serious deterreD! to any accused who, prior to trial, had "second thoughts" 
about his confession. In some cases, of course, the issue will be raised dishonestly 
a,t trial by the accused; in others, the accused will justifiably point to errors by or 
intimidation on the part of the recording judge. In all such cases" the trial court 
cannot escape ruling on the questions raised. But, it is submitted, such disputes 
will be many fewer, and less difficult to adjudicate, than those faced at the present 
time. Assuming minimum trust in the· judicial personnel of lower courts in 
Ethiopia, and adequate guidance and supervision from above, there is no reaSOD 
why Article 35 cannot be administered successfully according to its intended 
purpose. 
Trust in Our Judges 
That brings us to the second foreseeable objection to this proposal - that 
the lower court judges are not capable or sufficiently "qualified" to administer 
Article 35 correctly. One frequently hears this rationalization used to explain rules 
of procedure which deny needed powers of discretion to the lower courts. For 
example, it has been said that lower court judges are not "qualified" enough to 
be entrusted with the power to discharge from custody persons accused of serious 
crimes, even if their innocence is apparent.21 In fact, of course, the real effect of 
this "mistrust" of lower court judges is great injustice to the innocent accused. 
Under a code framed, apparently, on the theory that only public prosecutors and trial 
courts are "qualified" to recognize the innocence of suspects, an accused, once in 
custody, may stay there for long periods despite his apparent innocence, simply be-
cause no one has the authority to release him. Neither the police" nor the court 
• 
-26. A further precaution which might be taken by the .recording court to avoid later disputes 
would be to conduct the proceeding in the presence of respected elders of the commu-
nity, who could also be asked to sign ·as witnesses -to the cautions administered by the 
court. 
27. "The preliminary inquiry takes place before the district courts, whose judges are not 
all qualified, and it was decided not to entrust those judges with the power to release 
persons suspected by the police of aggravated murder or aggravated robbery, persons 
who would then easily be able to ~anish into ,thin air.' .. P. Graven, "La nouvelle pro. 
cedure penal ethiopienne," Rev. penale suisse, 7ge annee, 1963, n. 21 (Translation Seme-
reab Mikael, 1965.). 
M. Graven makes it clear in his article that this philosophy was generally in. 
strumental in the drafting of the Code: 
"In effect, rather -than give the courts leeway that they could not be trusted to 
use with the necessary discretion, the drafters chose to forego the advantages to be had 
from general clauses and chose to enumerate the conditions that govern the acts and 
decisions of the judicial . .. authorities before, during and after trial." [d. at p. 74. 
28. ArticlC? 28 allows the police the alternatives of conditional release on bail. or else pre. , 
sentat.lOn of the accused to the "nearest court;" unconditional discharge is apparently 
not permitted, even if "it is doubtful that an offence has been committed or that the 
summoned or arrested person has committed the offence complained of . . . ." 
- 337-
Print to PDF without this message by purchasing novaPDF (http://www.novapdf.com/)
JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN LAW - VOL .. 1lI .. No.1 
before which the arrestee is immediately brougbt29 nor the preliminary inquiry court30 
has been granted the power to release such a person unconditionallyll or, if the 
charge is a serious one~ even on bond.32 Yet one wonders how it can be true that 
Ethiopian lower courts are not "qualified" to determine such matters - when for 
hundreds of years, before the new codes and new procedures, they were satisfac-
torily exercising just such responsibilities.33 Surely the simple fact question 
'Of volun-tariness of a confession is within the competence of any alert and 
-conscientious judge to determine, and demands no special "qualifications". In 
fact, the recording court under Article 35 is certain~ by virtue of its proximity in 
place' and time to the circumstances surrounding the confession. to be in a far 
better position to ascertain its voluntariness than the "higheru trial court will be~ 
months later. 
Summary 
The administration of criminal justice in Ethiopia is marred by the frequent 
claims that convictions are based upon coerced confessions. The present system 
for adjudicating such claims and for deterring the practices which generate them 
is inadequate~ wHh the result that suspicion and mistrust abound. Article 35 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code was intended to provide the sole means of taking 
.admissible confessions, but It is being ignored. It will be to the benefit of the 
police, the courts~ and the public if the forthcoming code of evidence reinforces 
Article 35 in the way suggested. Meanwhile. the courts should ·exercise their 
present power to admit into evidence only those confessions which have ~n 
judicially recorded and certified to be voluntary under Article 35. 
Stanley Z. Fisher 
Law Faculty, Haile Sellassie I Universit} 
29. Article 59 offers the court only the alternatives of continued custody or release on bail; 
it does not, apparently, authorize unconditional discharge on the grounds of obvious 
• lnnocence. 
30. Article 89 requires the court to commit the accused for trial; there is no authority to 
release him even though the evidence of guilt presented at the inquiry appeared in· 
adequate to support a conviction. But the original draft of the Code provided otherwise. 
See Graven, cited above at note 27, p. 78. 
31. This is not unimportant It should not be assumed that the offer of conditional release 
on bond is one that every accused is able to take advantage of. Ethiopian prisons hold 
numbers of accused persons who cannot obtain the required guarantors. 
32. Art. 63. 
33. For example, it appears that under traditional practices conditional release on guarantee 
was frequently granted even for the most serious offences, so long as t.be accused was 
known in the community and could find a respectable person to vouch for his appear .. 
ance. And although "unqualifiedH rural officials made the decision as to who could and 
who could not be relied upon, .surely it was rare for a bonded accused to "vanish into 
thin air." 
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